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MR. JÜNGST: Good afternoon. My name is Oliver Jüngst. Welcome to the Sup-
plementary Protection Certificate (SPC) session. 
I am delighted to introduce the speakers and the panel: Marleen van den Horst with 
BarentsKrans in the Netherlands; Laëtitia Bénard from Allen & Overy in Paris; Brian Gray, 
a Partner in his own law firm in Toronto; Jürgen Dressel, who recently retired from his 
work at Novartis; Hans van Walderveen, a Judge at the District Court in The Hague; and, 
last but not least, Tom Mitcheson, a barrister in London. 
We will have our three speakers give their short presentations without an interrup-
tion in order to allow better discussion and more time for the panelists and the audience to 
involve themselves after the presentations have been given. 
Without further ado, I would like Marleen to start with her presentation. 
MS. VAN DEN HORST: Thank you, Oliver. 
I will talk about SPC reform in the European Union, especially focusing on the 
Max Planck Institute (MPI) Study and Annexes on the Legal Aspects of Supplementary 
Protection Certificates in the EU,1 a study ordered by the European Commission that 
resulted in thirty-three recommendations, which I will briefly discuss, and also the response 
of the European Commission thereto. I will pay extra attention to the SPC manufacturing 
waiver and say only a few words about the Unitary SPC. 
The MPI report was published 28 May 2018. It is 700 pages long and has seven 
annexes. It was a tremendous study that focused on a legal analysis of the EU SPC system. 
The analysis was done on the basis of the caselaw of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), the national courts, and on the decisions to grant in the practice of the 
national patent offices (NPOs). As part of the legal analysis there was also a fact-finding 
study. It was a thorough consultation of all the stakeholders using interviews, an online 
survey, questionnaires, and two seminars. On the basis of all of that, MPI came with thirty-
three recommendations, which I would like to summarize for you as follows. 
• Consolidate the Medicinal Products Regulation by incorporating provisions from 
the Plant Protection Products Regulation. 
• Distinguish medicinal products for human and for veterinary use either by split-
ting the Regulation into two or by treating them explicitly as different products. 
• Clarify definitions, amongst which is the concept of the marketing authorization.  
• Most importantly, and repeatedly given as a recommendation, is to close the gap 
between the wording of Article 3(a)–3(d) of the Regulation and CJEU case law. 
• Clarify whether any patentee or only a patentee who obtained marketing author-
ization is entitled to an SPC, the third-party problems. 
• Allow SPCs for new active substances used in drug/medical device combination. 
• Provide for a SPC manufacturing waiver. 
• Adopt a uniform Bolar exemption in light of the Unified Patent Court Agreement 
(UPCA). 
• Further unification of procedural aspects of SPCs granted by the NPOs. 
• Lastly, create a system for granting unitary SPCs. 
According to the MPI, the purpose of the SPC legislation was to compensate patent 
holders for the time lost in obtaining regulatory approval for products containing new active 
substances. The original intention of lawmakers was to grant one SPC per product or com-
bination authorized for the first time. 
The MPI continued that the CJEU had by teleological interpretation extended the 
scope to more SPCs per product, SPCs for new formulations, second medical indications, 
 
1 Study and Annexes on the Legal Aspects of Supplementary Protection Certificates in the 





Verbatim Transceedings, Inc. 714/960-4577 
3 
and not insisting on the first marketing authorization. According to the MPI, this calls for 
political decision-making. 
If you look at the thirty-three recommendations, how should they be achieved; 
what should be done with them? According to MPI, they should lead to an amendment of 
the Regulation as such and/or to the European Commission issuing implementing regula-
tions, and ultimately to providing “soft law” in the form of guidelines. In my opinion, soft 
law in the form of guidelines is quite questionable because what is the status, what is the 
weight, that guidelines carry? 
The response of the European Commission by Alfonso Calles Sanchez was quite 
appalling. In a seminar in November last year where the findings and the study of the MPI 
were discussed by stakeholders and the Commission, it became clear that the Commission 
was only willing to pick up on one item, and that is the manufacturing waiver, and actually 
made clear that it was not going to do anything with the study. This is appalling if you 
think about the fact that they ordered this study and for one and a half years all stakeholders 
participated. But it is as it is.  
Now let us turn to one thing that has been successfully taken up, the SPC manu-
facturing waiver. The legislative proposal was adopted by the European Parliament last 
week, on 17 April, and the Regulation amending Regulation 469/2009 is expected to enter 
into force in July this year.2 
If we look at the proposal as adopted, the SPC manufacturing waiver is an excep-
tion to SPC exclusivity that allows for the manufacturer of medicinal products for export 
to non-EU countries to stockpile in the European Union for six months prior to the expiry 
of the SPC and for any related acts that are necessary in the preparation thereof. 
But it is regulated quite strictly, also to keep transparency and protect the rights of 
the SPC holders. The manufacturer is required to: 
• File a notification (standard form which is also published with the proposal) three 
months prior to starting the manufacture of the product either for export or for stockpiling 
or for both objectives. This should be filed at the NPO in the Member State(s) where these 
preparatory actions or manufacture are going to take place. 
• Not only should it be filed at the NPO, also the SPC holder should be notified 
and be kept updated on all the developments related thereto. 
• Products that are intended for export should be explicitly labeled as such and 
there is a special logo that should be applied on the packaging of those products. 
• Moreover, the manufacturer of the products has to ensure that there is docu-
mented evidence of its due diligence to inform its supply chain (the storage house or the 
exporter) so that they are aware of the conditions of the waiver and that they comply. 
There are also obligations for the NPOs to publish the notification and updates as 
soon as possible. 
Something new is that the European Commission has the task to carry out regular 
evaluations (every five years) of whether the effects and goals of this manufacturing waiver 
are indeed achieved. 
To finalize my presentation, when does it enter into force? The waiver applies to 




2 Regulation (EU) 2019/933 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 
2019 amending Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate 
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MR. JÜNGST: Thank you, Marleen.   
Laëtitia, please. 
MS. BÉNARD: I will be talking about the case law in the last twelve months. A 
lot has happened in the SPC field, which is not surprising because we say the same every 
year. 
The CJEU has issued two important decisions, one in July 2018 in the Gilead case3 
and one in March 2019 in the Abraxis case.4 
There are also two interesting referrals: one from the Paris Court of Appeals, which 
is the first referral ever from France on the SPC Regulation, as to the correct interpretation 
of the Neurim5 decision; and another referral from the U.K. courts — which was thought 
to be the last one before Brexit, but because Brexit keeps not happening, I guess there is 
still time for an additional referral — on the third-party SPCs. 
Given the limited time that I have, I have chosen to focus on the Teva v. Gilead 
decision and the impact of the CJEU’s decision in Europe. 
Let me remind you of the facts. Gilead holds a patent covering tenofovir for the 
treatment of HIV and a marketing authorization for a combination product of tenofovir 
plus emtricitabine. Gilead obtained an SPC for this combination on the basis of a claim 
covering tenofovir and “optionally other therapeutic ingredients.” 
There are two factual differences compared to the Sanofi6 case. Gilead did not have 
another SPC for tenofovir alone because the marketing authorization for tenofovir was 
quickly granted within the first five years of the patent protection. The second difference 
is that emtricitabine, the second active ingredient of the combination, was discovered after 
the filing of the patent.  
This was, however, not the reason for the referral. Indeed, in the framework of a 
revocation action brought by Teva in the United Kingdom, the U.K. court stated as follows:  
The referring court takes the view that, notwithstanding the judgments 
delivered by the Court on interpretation of Article 3(a) of Regulation No 
469/2009, the meaning to be given to that provision remains unclear. 
    That court states that, admittedly, it is clear from the Court’s case-law 
that the concept of a “product protected by a basic patent” within the mean-
ing of Article 3(a) of Regulation No 469/2009 refers to the rules governing 
the extent of protection, not the rules governing infringement. 
    Nevertheless, the judgments of 12 December 2013, Actavis Group PTC 
and Actavis UK (C 443/12, EU:C:2013:833), of 12 December 2013, Eli 
Lilly and Company (C 493/12, EU:C:2013:835), and of 12 March 2015, 
Actavis Group PTC and Actavis UK (C 577/13, EU:C:2015:165) imply 
that the principles described in the preceding paragraph are not sufficient 
for the purposes of determining whether a “product is protected by a basic 
patent in force” and that it is also necessary to take into account the “sub-
ject-matter of the invention covered by the patent” or the “core inventive 
advance” of the patent. The referring court takes the view that it is not clear 
 
3 Case C-121/17, Teva UK Ltd. V Gilead Sciences Inc., EU:C:2018:585 (July 25, 2018).  
4 Case C-443/17, Abraxis Bioscience LLC v Comptroller Gen. of Patents, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:238 (Mar. 21, 2019). 
5 Case C-130/11, Neurim Pharm. Ltd v Comptroller-Gen. of Patents, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:489 (July 19, 2012). 
6 Case C-443/12, Actavis Group PTC EHF and Actavis UK Ltd v Sanofi, 
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from that case-law whether those requirements are relevant for the pur-
poses of the interpretation of Article 3(a) of Regulation No 469/2009.7 
So the U.K. court sought clarification in that respect. 
The Gilead case was heard by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU, which is the first 
time ever the Grand Chamber of the CJEU decided to hear a matter relating to the SPC 
Regulation. 
At the hearing, it was said that “the intention of the Court was to clarify once and 
for all Article 3(a).” We will examine whether this is the case, and you can guess what the 
response is. 
In this decision the CJEU set out two distinct factual situations in which Article 
3(a) is met: a product cannot be considered protected by a basic patent enforced within the 
meaning of Article 3(a) of the Regulation unless the product which is the subject of the 
SPC is (a) either expressly mentioned in the claims of the patent; or (b) those claims relate 
to that product necessarily and specifically. 
So there are two different factual situations. The first one is when the claims 
expressly mention the product; in that case Article 3(a) is immediately satisfied. The other 
situation is when the product is not expressly mentioned, the claims need to relate to the 
product necessarily and specifically. 
To assess the second situation the Court said for that purpose, from the point of 
view of a person skilled in the art and on the basis of the prior art at the filing date or 
priority date of the basic patent, the combination of those active ingredients must (1) nec-
essarily, in the light of the description and drawings of that patent, fall under the invention 
covered by the patent; and (2) each of those active ingredients must be specifically identi-
fiable in the light of all the information disclosed by the patent. 
So the question is: has the CJEU achieved its objective? Is it settled once and for 
all? I’m afraid not at all if one looks at the decisions that have been issued by the national 
courts in Europe since then. 
I would like to point out one particular case concerning an SPC owned by Merck 
covering the combination of ezetimibe and simvastatin, this combination being expressly 
claimed in one of the claims of the patent. For the sake of transparency, I have been repre-
senting Merck in France in that case. 
This SPC has been litigated in thirteen countries in Europe. In most of the countries 
the SPC was deemed valid or prima facie valid in preliminary injunction actions, but there 
are several jurisdictions which ruled in the exact opposite way. Let’s have a look at what 
has been said in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
In a decision on the merits in France, the Paris First Instance Court found the SPC 
valid in view of the Gilead decision. It also issued several preliminary injunction decisions 
removing the generics from the market and expressly said that “the Court of Justice does 
not impose in view of Gilead any additional requirement according to which the two active 
ingredients or their combination should be an invention of the basic patent or that the com-
bination should be the subject matter of the invention.” 
The French court said that the Gilead decision may be regarded as “a reversal by 
the Court of Justice of its prior Sanofi decision,” and it added that in that case the defendant 
argued that given that Gilead only relates to Article 3(a), it did not have any impact on 
Article 3(c). The French court said, “No, the court cannot agree with this analysis, which 
would lead to admitting two different definitions of the product within the same article, 
which is clearly excluded by the glossary of the Regulation.” 
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The Düsseldorf Court of Appeal ruled in a different way. It said that yes, Article 
3(a) is met but Article 3(c) is not met, and the court said that the CJEU’s preliminary deci-
sion in Teva v. Gilead says nothing on this.8 It was issued exclusively with regard to Article 
3(a) and for this reason alone is of no significance for the interpretation of Article 3(c). So 
an exact opposite ruling compared to the French court. 
Finally, The Hague Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion as the German 
court but with a totally different reasoning, saying that even if the combination is expressly 
claimed, it does not meet the requirement of Article 3.9 
I find it really concerning to see that after this decision from the CJEU was issued 
by the Grand Chamber — which was supposed to settle Article 3(a) once and for all — we 
are seeing such diverging decisions in Europe. 
MR. JÜNGST: Thank you, Laëtitia. Indeed the last one is a very interesting case. 
Laëtitia and I have been presenting different sides of this and we have both been successful. 
So good news. 
To add another layer of complexity, not only the various national courts that 
Laëtitia has mentioned — Germany in particular, very close to our friends from the Neth-
erlands; in France it was decided differently — but even in the Austrian Oberlandesgericht, 
the Commercial Court, different chambers have decided differently in the very same case. 
So you can see that this is really a complex issue. 
Brian? 
MR. GRAY: Thank you. Now Canada has entered the weird and wonderful world 
of patent term extension. I’m not so sure I’m looking forward to it. 
Canada was dragged kicking and screaming into the patent term extension system. 
It was the last of the G7 countries to do so, and it was really forced to do so as part of the 
Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). It 
came into force on September 21, 2017. 
Just to complicate things, we call it a Certificate of Supplementary Protection 
(CSP), not the Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC), but it is the same thing. 
The provisions are similar because they were in fact negotiated as part CETA, so 
the European SPC Regulations were largely adopted.  
There are a couple of significant differences. 
• The extension was capped at two years. 
• The other significant difference is very unusual: you must file the CSP within 
one year of the first regulatory submission for the medicinal ingredient or combination in 
the European Union or any Member State thereof, or the United States, Australia, Switzer-
land, or Japan. So it is an unusual one-year requirement that does not exist in Europe or 
anywhere else as far as I understand. 
• The other unusual thing is that you can only have one CSP for each drug product 
no matter how many patents or patentees there are, which may result in some competing 
applications, and there is a bizarre system for determining priority of competing patent 
term extensions. 
I would like to speak now about two rejections that are currently under judicial 
review. I am not going to say anything more about the specifics of our system. 
 
8 Landgericht Düsseldorf [District Court of Düsseldorf] Oct. 1, 2018, Merck Sharp & 
Dohme Corp. vs. ratiopharm GmbH et al., 4b O 39/18 (Ger.). 
9 Gerechtshof [The Hague Court of Appeal] Oct. 23, 2018, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. 
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The first of the rejections relates to a GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) application for the 
vaccine SHINGRIX. SHINGRIX, as you may know, is a suspension containing varicella-zoster 
vir glycoprotein E (gE antigen) adjuvanted with GSK AS01a adjuvant. 
Actually the patent was relating to the commercial product. This is a thing that as 
a patent attorney I have difficulty understanding. I can sort of understand sometimes when 
the claims seem to expand beyond what was invented maybe, but in this case the claim was 
for the commercial product, which was the active ingredient, the gE antigen, along with an 
adjuvant. 
But the Minister rejected this on the basis that it didn’t contain an eligible claim 
under the regulations. The Minister determined that the medicinal ingredient in SHINGRIX 
is limited to one medicinal ingredient, the gE antigen, and the adjuvant is non-medicinal. 
Therefore, notwithstanding that the claim was directed to a commercial product, the prod-
uct that was specifically marketed, nevertheless the Minister has so far denied the SPC for 
this product. 
This is like the situation as I understand it in Europe for a similar GSK vaccine that 
was adjuvanted in the case CJEU C-210/13.10 That application was also rejected. 
But I ask myself as a naïve patent attorney, an ingenue in the area of patent term 
extension, why a patent claim that is directed to the commercial product should be denied 
protection because it has a non-medicinal ingredient in it, where in fact the claim is not 
actually extending beyond the monopoly because the claim is directed to the medicinal 
ingredient and a non-medicinal ingredient in combination, so that by extending it is not 
going to interfere with any monopoly of anyone else unreasonably. 
The next case I want to talk about is relevant to this provision, which is also, I 
believe, a provision similar to the provision in the European Union, which is the question 
of the scope of a CSP. It has the same rights as a patent — this is the quote from the 
Canadian law but I believe that at least the principles are similar in the European Union — 
“only with respect to the making, constructing, using and selling of any drug that contains 
the medicinal ingredient or combination of medicinal ingredients, set out in the certificate, 
by itself or in addition to any other medicinal ingredient.” 
This seems to suggest that the scope of a CSP is limited, but it also is limited to 
the combination when used by itself or in addition to any other medicinal ingredients. 
Therefore, one would think that a combination similar to the one in the Teva v. Gilead case 
should be extended. 
But, aha! There is a second judicial application that is now under review in the 
Federal Court of Canada, ViiV Healthcare v. the Minister of Health.11 This case involves 
two owners that both had patented medicinal ingredients; ViiV had one and Janssen in 
partnership with a Japanese company had the other. So each party had its own patented 
medicinal ingredient. They marketed the product as JULUCA®, a combination of 
dolutegravir and rilpivirine. 
It is similar to the problem in Teva v. Gilead. In this case it was a combination of 
two active ingredients and there was no claim to the combination. However, both of the 
combined ingredients were individually patented. So I ask myself again: Is it right to not 
allow a patent term extension for that product? 
I am reminded of Mr. Justice Arnold’s statement in the Gilead case. He was asking 
himself what the CJEU intended in the Teva v. Gilead decision. He said, “What the Court 
is saying is that the purpose of the SPC Regulation is to enable the holder of the basic 
 
10 Case C-210/13, Glaxosmithkline Biologicals SA v Comptroller Gen. of Patents, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:762 (Nov. 14, 2013).  
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patent to obtain supplementary protection for what the patentee actually invented and not 
for what the patentee did not invent.” 
Well, it is hard to disagree with that, but I thought that claims were in fact written 
to cover what the patentee actually invented. So I find it difficult. I find the system now is 
not protecting what the patentee actually invented. I understand this disjuncture between 
patent claims and approved products, and we’ve got to fix it. 
Now, unfortunately, in Canada, because we copied your darn European rules, we 
have the same problems now ourselves that we have to sort out. I hope that you guys can 
sort it out for us. 
Thank you. 
MR. JÜNGST: I’m not so sure. Thank you, Brian. 
I loved the reaction of parts of the audience when the term “Brexit” was used. I am 
tempted to say it again. 
Tom, what is the current state of play regarding referrals from the United King-
dom? We know that the U.K. courts have referred quite a few cases to the CJEU. Is there 
still something going on? 
MR. MITCHESON: There is. Richard Arnold referred a case in February, and he 
did it in record time, because at that stage there was still a risk that the United Kingdom 
would leave on the 29th of March. Thankfully, we didn’t. But, in case we were going to, 
he ordered the parties to come to court, agree on the question, and get it off to the CJEU in 
record time, so that the reference was in. This is the reference in the Genentech v. Lilly 
case12 about third parties. So, at least while Richard Arnold is still a judge, there will be 
references made regularly by the United Kingdom to the CJEU. 
Before we open up to the floor, I would like to perhaps explore why there is so 
little harmonization and why there is such dissatisfaction with the CJEU’s caselaw on 
SPCs. I think there are three interrelated reasons. 
First of all, the drafters of the legislation way back didn’t have many of the issues 
which are now causing difficulties in European courts in their minds when they drafted the 
legislation. They didn’t think about combinations or vaccines; they didn’t think about the 
third-party issue; and they didn’t think about biologics in functional claims because all they 
had at that time were small molecules. That is the first problem. 
Second, I think the CJEU suffers because it has to deal with these matters on a 
piecemeal basis only. The judges are not familiar with patent law, there is no EU patent 
yet, and the CJEU is a bit like a supertanker — it has difficulty changing its view on things. 
It won’t cast aside old judgments even if the Advocate General says, as it did in the recent 
Abraxis case, that the Neurim decision was wrong. It refuses to change course. This causes 
it problems. 
For instance, in the Medeva case,13 which is perhaps the origin of many of the 
difficulties we have under Article 3(a), one of the options for the Court was to have an 
infringement test for Article 3(a) and then a narrow test under Article 3(b). That would 
have solved many of the problems that the courts face at the moment. 
But because there’s a previous decision, the Farmitalia decision,14 where Article 
3(b) had been held to be broadly construed, the CJEU had to go down the other route and 
select a more restrictive interpretation of Article 3(a). Instead of a simple infringement test, 
 
12 Case C-239/19, Eli Lilly and Co. v. Genentech Inc., ECLI:EU:C:2019:687 (Sept. 5, 
2019).  
13 Case C-322/10, Medeva BV v Comptroller Gen. of Patents, ECLI:EU:C:2011:773 
(Nov. 24, 2011).  
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we now have all the difficulties with the wording of the various judgments, and that is a 
problem that we all have to grapple with. 
Finally — and this is reflected, I think, in the Max Planck report, which if you 
haven’t looked at I would urge you to do so — many of these issues are not really issues 
for the judges, the poor judges who have to interpret the legislation; they are policy issues 
and they should have been dealt with in the legislation originally and they should be dealt 
with in a revision of the legislation. 
One of the judges in the CJEU’s Lilly v. HGS15 hearing asked the Commission, 
“When are you bringing forward the new legislation?” The Commission had no answer 
then and it still has no answer.  
All we have is the minor change for the manufacturing waiver. We have none of 
the additional improvements which the Max Planck Institute report commissioned by the 
Commission has suggested. 
Until we get that wholesale reform of the legislation, I don’t think it is possible for 
the poor judges to square the circle and come up with a solution based on the current word-
ing of the legislation. 
A unitary patent will help. A unitary SPC will help. Until we have reform, we are 
likely to be having these meetings year after year and discussing the difficulties and the 
lack of harmonization across Europe because it is an impossible task with the legislation 
that we currently have. 
Anyway, I’ll be interested to hear what other people think about that. 
MR. JÜNGST: Thank you, Tom. 
Brian, I think that was in response to your question. Have we sorted out things for 
Canada? Probably not, not yet.  
Laëtitia mentioned, absolutely rightly so, that the Teva v. Gilead case was decided 
by the Grand Chamber, which is not often the case, and that there was hope, I understand, 
that now things at least regarding Article 3(a) of the Regulation 469/2009 are sorted out. 
Hans, you reacted to that. Is that not your view? Are there still other open ques-
tions? 
JUDGE VAN WALDERVEEN: I agree with Laëtitia that it is not that clear yet, 
as apparently the CJEU thought that it would be. I have two issues. 
This poor judge was drafting his judgment in the Searle v. Sandoz16 darunavir case 
during the Christmas period. That is the same case was dealt with by Mr. Justice Arnold in 
the U.K. High Court and by the U.K. Court of Appeal, which referred a question to the 
CJEU.  
At that time I only had Gilead because Abraxis was rendered later in February and 
my judgment is from January 8th, so I had to reread and to rethink the Gilead case. It says, 
as I understand it — and that’s what I decided in summary proceedings, and I have learned 
that no appeal has been filed — they use a two-step test:  
(1) They require that if the active ingredient is not expressly mentioned in the 
claims of the basic patent, then one of those claims must relate to it “implicitly but neces-
sarily and specifically.” What that means — nobody knows. That is one of the open ques-
tions. 
 
15 Case C-493/12, Eli Lilly and Co. v. Human Genome Sciences Inc., 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:835 (Dec. 12, 2013).  
16 Rechtbank Den Haag [District Court of the Hague], Jan. 8, 2019, G.D. Searle v. 
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(2) The Court goes on and says that “[f]or that purpose, the active ingredient must, 
from the point of view of a person skilled in the art and in the light of the description and 
drawings of the basic patent, necessarily fall under the invention covered by that patent.” 
To summarize, the first step is that the active ingredient product must be covered 
by the patent in the sense that it must be covered by the invention of the patent. Maybe that 
is the same as what Arnold and Floyd call the “core inventive advance of the patent.” 
The second step is that the CJEU said that “the person skilled in the art must be 
able to identify that product specifically in the light of all the information disclosed by that 
patent” — and this is the other issue that is unclear for me — “on the basis of the prior art 
at the filing date or priority date of the patent.” So the product should be identifiable. 
But as I mentioned in my summary judgment, as did Justice Arnold, I think that 
this is a slip of the pen and that the CJEU meant to say here “the common general 
knowledge.” If this would be correct — and I must say that they use the term “the prior 
art” not once but several times in the judgment— this would mean that many more SPCs 
can be issued because that is a very different thing. 
Furthermore, in my darunavir case I had to decide whether darunavir was covered 
by the invention of the patent — I said yes, like my English colleagues did — and subse-
quently I had to decide whether darunavir was identifiable at the first priority date. There 
was no mention of darunavir in the patent whatsoever, so nobody denied at the hearing that 
darunavir falls under the claims of the patent. But whether this second test was met is 
something that I decided in the negative. 
This leaves open the question: if you have a Markush formula, which could cover 
millions of compounds, — the darunavir case had a Markush formula — how should you 
draft your patent in order to get an SPC? More particularly, how should we apply the “iden-
tifiable test” in these cases? 
MR. JÜNGST: Thank you, Hans. That sounds all very complicated and complex, 
and indeed it is, and not because you have presented it in that way, definitely not. I find 
myself often in a situation that I am in each and every case reading the decision again, 
trying to understand what the CJEU meant. 
Are there, Jürgen, any ideas, any chances, of making things simpler, to be more 
predictable, to be easier? What are your views in that regard? 
MR. DRESSEL: Possibly. 
Let’s return to what actually the SPC Regulation tried to achieve. It wanted suffi-
cient time for the originators to actually be rewarded for their R&D. It was supposed to 
actually enhance R&D. For that you need: 
• First, more time; and also legal certainty so you actually can rely on this time. 
• For the internal market a harmonized procedure in each and every country. 
• And you don’t want to make it too difficult for the granting authorities. What is 
going to happen should be predictable when you apply for an SPC. 
I think at the time when this legislation was created, they tried to cover very dif-
ferent types of industries. They tried to cover human and veterinary vaccines and agro-
chemicals, all of which have very different requirements. 
When you look, for example, at vaccines and agrochemicals, very often you actu-
ally have combinations which contain new chemical entities as the first product to enter 
the market. You want to inject the vaccine not fifteen times into the baby, but what you 
rather want to have is a cocktail of different vaccines which you can use to vaccinate a 
child. 
Similarly, when you put something onto the fields, what you want is something 
that kills all different kinds of weeds. You do not want the farmer to go into the fields 
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combinations very often that come for the first time when the first approval of a new chem-
ical entity is done. 
The CJEU, I think, in its teleological interpretation tried to do justice to all these 
different interests of industry, and they did things in a way, I think in retrospect, that the 
SPC Regulation could also have been interpreted differently. They didn’t really have to 
appease all these interests. For example: 
• They gave new SPCs, additional SPCs, for combinations. I don’t think that is 
absolutely necessary when you read the SPC Regulation.  
• They gave the SPC to third parties. Okay, the SPC Regulation is silent about that, 
but you don’t really have to do it. 
• They at least have language in their decisions that you could use to interpret sec-
ond medical uses or new formulations as a possibility for additional SPCs. 
All this has led to many, many different decisions and huge confusion. I think we 
all agree that we are not much wiser with each new decision that comes out.  
Unfortunately, I have the impression that the CJEU is also not very diligent in the 
choice of its words. Sometimes they say “identified in the wording of the claims” or “spec-
ified in the wording of the claims,” and everybody is starting then to wonder Do they mean 
something different now? Or they used the word “priority” and everybody starts thinking 
My gosh, what do they mean by that? Is there a teleological reason behind that? 
I am wondering about whether this uncertainty, which also suddenly starts to affect 
formerly granted SPCs which seemed rock-solid, whether we bought additional possibili-
ties for additional SPCs which are probably very weak, on one hand, and thereby also 
endangered previously strong SPCs, on the other hand, because suddenly people don’t 
know any more whether the SPCs granted really will serve their purpose; or whether, for 
example, an SPC based on a genus claim is not right any more, it might be invalid; or you 
suddenly have to choose selection inventions, which are notoriously weak, and therefore 
can and will be challenged. So you run into trouble there. 
I wonder whether we shouldn’t return to the origins, where you actually only got 
one SPC for any new chemical entity whether it is first approved as a mono-product or as 
a combination product; and whether you should only allow SPCs with the agreement of the 
marketing authorization holder, so you basically would have no third-party SPCs unless 
the marketing authorization holder, for example by taking a license, agrees to that. 
I think it doesn’t really make sense to grant all those SPCs for second medical uses 
for combinations and who knows what because these exclusivities are not really that solid, 
they can be easily challenged, and I would suggest that therefore you cannot really make 
business decisions on them. I think one needs something different for these types of inno-
vations, maybe something like an additional regulatory data protection. 
I understand that many of these things I say were already in the Max Planck Insti-
tute proposal. You’ll notice that the European Commission did not take those things up; 
they only adopted the SPC manufacturing waiver. I can understand the concern of origina-
tors to actually open this can of worms and open the SPC Regulation at a time when IP for 
pharmaceutical companies is already under strong attack. So everybody is afraid that you 
actually might end up with much less than you started out with. I can understand that. 
I think we are at a time where each and every new CJEU decision adds additional 
confusion and I cannot really see how it can be resolved. I cannot really see it. Therefore, 
I suggest we go back to the roots. 
MR. JÜNGST: Before we open the floor to the audience, I want to ask for com-
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JUDGE VAN WALDERVEEN: As I mentioned, I agree with Laëtitia and I agree 
with Jürgen that a lot of the jurisprudence of the CJEU is not clear. But I think that things 
have become clearer in the meantime. That is a difference between your opinion and mine. 
I forgot to mention one other thing. I said apparently the CJEU thinks that Gilead 
is a very clear case. Why do I think that they have that idea? Because in the darunavir case 
they sent a so-called notification of a judgment having a similar effect. The CJEU sent a 
letter to the Court of Appeal asking whether or not it was still necessary to have a decision 
on the question referred. That same notification was sent to the Bundespatentgericht on the 
sitagliptin case. Both the Court of Appeal and the Bundespatentgericht refused to withdraw 
their referring questions because they both think that it is not clear yet. 
MR. GRAY: I’m sorry to say I don’t agree with your view about a single claim for 
the essential first composition. It seems to me that you ignore the question of, let’s say, a 
picture claim, or let’s say the SHINGRIX situation, where you have a product that was not 
really useful until it was adjuvanted so that it had a commercially successful product, and 
it was inventive because a claim was issued for the combination. 
Let’s take the simple situation of a picture claim, if you know what I mean. You’ve 
got a claim for A + B + C. It’s very specific. It’s about the first patent for the composition. 
It may be that A is old, B is old, and C is old, but you’ve got a claim for A + B + C.  
What is the political and policy reason why you shouldn’t extend the term of that 
patent under a patent term extension because you are not in fact interfering with any other 
person; you’ve got a claim for a specific product and it is limited to that product and you 
are extending the patent in that case? And, if you don’t allow that, then it seems to me you 
are disincentivizing people to actually combine drugs together and make commercially 
successful products. 
I understand the Teva v. Gilead situation is complicated. The Teva v. Gilead situ-
ation is different. There you got a patent for A and you didn’t get a patent for B and the 
commercial product was A + B. There the problem of extending the term for the claim for 
A is that you will possibly interfere with the commercialization of somebody using A not 
combined with B. So that I understand, and that’s a complicated situation. 
But what I don’t understand is why you wouldn’t allow the extension of a patent 
that is directed to what I would call or patent attorneys would call a “picture claim,” a very 
narrow claim directed to the combination. 
MR. DRESSEL: May I respond immediately to you, Brian, and I also have some-
thing to say to you, Hans? 
I think there is no dispute, Brian, that innovations like these combinations are good 
and important. But when you look at the policy reasons for which kinds of pharmaceutical 
innovations should be rewarded, you are talking about fixed-dose combinations. When you 
look at the clinical development of these fixed-dose combinations, they were actually 
developed as a free combination first. And then some drugs, especially in the cancer area, 
stay free combinations. So actually the R&D effort went into the free combination, but 
nevertheless you can only get an additional SPC for the fixed-dose combination. That 
seems inherently unfair to me. 
I would suggest that you cannot really solve each and every problem regarding 
innovation of SPCs, especially if you base them on a possibly inherently weak right. You 
are talking about a basic right: A + B + C + D.  
Do you know how difficult it can be to actually maintain such a patent? You are 
talking about something that expires ten years from now, and then you add another five 
years on top of that, but in the meantime your basic patent has been killed by the courts 
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I think you need a different type of incentive for that. That’s why I actually sug-
gested perhaps a separate regulatory data protection for that. I guess you guys in Canada 
don’t have such a strong regulatory data protection. 
MR. GRAY: We have data protection, but not as long. 
MR. DRESSEL: While I am all in favor of actually compensating originators for 
these types of innovations — also second medical uses and who knows what — I think the 
SPC is not the right tool for doing it, and actually what you are getting instead now is 
something which weakens even your strong SPCs for the NCEs. 
As I said, you have situations where you have a Markush genus or a functional 
genus and you don’t really know whether you actually can get a valid SPC based on that 
one. The other courts do disagree. 
Now regarding what you said, Hans, that actually the picture has become clearer, 
I strongly doubt that, and when I look at the reaction in the audience I take some comfort 
that there appear to be more people here who also strongly doubt that. Each and every time 
the CJEU was asked to clarify the situation, I think they added an additional point of lack 
of clarity.  
They usually were very clear in what they did not want. They clearly said, “We do 
not want an infringement test,” which was actually the clearest and easiest test in the past. 
It had its problems, true, because it also led to a certain unfairness in combination situa-
tions, as I said before, in the agro and vaccine industry. 
JUDGE VAN WALDERVEEN: But the Court said “no.” 
MR. DRESSEL: However, it was extremely clear. It is easy for patent offices to 
ask, “Is it covered by the formula or by this functional term” or who knows what. 
And when you look at decisions — I think it was the French decision where they 
combined this. I never remember the name of this one component. Was it ezetimibe? 
MS. BÉNARD: Ezetimibe and simvastatin 
MR. DRESSEL: With simvastatin or atorvastatin? 
MS. BÉNARD: Simvastatin. 
MR. DRESSEL: The first one was simvastatin and the second one was atorva-
statin. They were all based on the same basic patent, three SPCs based on the same patent. 
MS. BÉNARD: There is no SPC for atorvastatin. 
MR. DRESSEL: Not granted. So we have to deal in the Court of Appeal or wher-
ever with the rejection. 
MR. JÜNGST: Sorry, Jürgen, Hans, and Tom. I think we have debate in the panel, 
and that’s good, but it would also be great to have some debate with the audience. So 
please, if you have questions, comments, or observations. 
PARTICIPANT [Judge Rian Kalden, Court of Appeal of The Hague, The Hague]: 
I have a couple of observations. 
As to the clarity of the CJEU judgment, I happened to be at the meeting at the Max 
Planck Institute in November. The meeting started off with a presentation by a lady from 
the Legal Department of the European Commission who has been involved in advising the 
CJEU in all of these SPC judgments from Medeva on. She told us that we should stop 
referring questions because now it was entirely clear. 
Then I raised my hand and I asked, “Well, can you then please tell me whether, 
under the first of the two questions, we should understand that to mean that the product 
must be within the scope of protection of the claim or that the product incorporates the core 
of the invention, in accordance with the inventive advance test that was suggested by 
Richard Arnold?” 
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Then, when I gave my presentation and I made the same comment as Hans did, 
saying that it was quite unclear whether the CJEU actually meant that the prior art had to 
be taken into account or just the common general knowledge, I noticed she was sort of 
shocked. After my presentation, she raised her hand and asked, “What’s the difference?” 
I think that actually makes it very clear why it’s still unclear, because the CJEU 
does not have any idea about patent concepts, and without such knowledge it is very 
difficult to give clear guidance to us. 
My second observation is about Jürgen’s proposals. Although I sympathize with 
the expressed need to have something which is very clear, that will require new legislation, 
and it is very unlikely that that is going to happen. 
So the only thing that I can think of, if you really want to get rid of all the unclarity 
after Medeva, is that, along the lines as the European Commission did for the patents on 
plants situation, that they issue a notification or clarification or whatever that we should 
reintroduce the infringement test. But that is very unlikely to happen too. 
MR. JÜNGST: Thank you. 
Is there a further question? 
PARTICIPANT [James Love, Knowledge Ecology International, Washington, 
D.C.]: The patent extension is expensive for society. I mean the patent itself is expensive, 
but the extension is also expensive. 
There should be a means test. You shouldn’t really get any patent extensions if 
your global revenues are large. Giving a patent extension to Humera, for example, I think 
is just absurd. 
The other thing is that the patent extension is an inefficient way to incentivize 
innovation because it comes very late and, because of the way companies discount cash 
flows, the present value of a patent extension is not as high for the company as it is going 
to be in present value terms for society. 
So wouldn’t it be better if the government wanted to incentivize innovation to 
provide cash bonus innovation inducement prizes, things like that, as opposed to patent 
extensions, which are essentially the product of just how good your patent lawyers are and, 
as the panelist demonstrated, turn on relatively arbitrary issues unrelated to the investments 
that are involved or the therapeutic value or even the need for the incentive? 
MR. JÜNGST: Thank you. 
PARTICIPANT [John Richards, Ladas & Parry, New York]: Just one quick 
observation on that. Up until 1979, the United Kingdom had a provision in the statute for 
extension of patent term for failure to make enough money out of your patent that appeared 
to have existed because of circumstances beyond your control. Would something like that 
address the issue just raised? 
PARTICIPANT [Christine Kanz, Hoyng Rokh Monegier, Düsseldorf]: I would 
like to help promote a position that Peter Meier-Beck from the Federal Court of Justice in 
Germany has been making in writing and in some presentations. I think that position helps 
make things a lot clearer. 
He is saying that we do not have a two-stage test and that all the CJEU wanted to 
say since Medeva is that we have to apply Article 69, and we have to apply it not as an 
infringement test but as a subject-matter test, so the only question that needs to be answered 
is whether a combination or whatever falls under the claims. That is a very classical Article 
69 test, and it makes perfect sense because patent law is not harmonized. The CJEU does 
not have the competence to ask for an additional test on constructing claims. 
To me that is the only sensible interpretation. What we are trying to do is make 
sense out of words like “identified,” “specified,” “implicitly but necessarily.” But that is 
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MS. BÉNARD: I want to reply to that. Actually, the Gilead decision is very clear 
about the fact that Article 69 needs to be taken into account. Despite that, three jurisdictions 
ruled in very different ways when arguably applying exactly Article 69. So I don’t think 
that that will solve anything, unfortunately. 
MR. JÜNGST: Trevor?  
PARTICIPANT [Trevor Cook, WilmerHale, New York]: Given that it seems the 
Commission has set its mind against doing anything to sort out this mess, and given that it 
is almost a matter of diminishing returns when courts make references to the CJEU and it 
just makes the situation worse and worse, is this something that national judges should be 
getting together on to try to find some common approaches amongst them, really almost 
sidetracking the CJEU from this point of view? 
JUDGE VAN WALDERVEEN: That is definitely not done. What we can do in 
fact is to keep referring questions and explain how we think that Article 3(a) should be 
applied. But when we get the answers back they see it differently. 
MR. MITCHESON: I’ve heard of this thing called the Venice Conference, though. 
Is this not something you could discuss next time they meet? 
PARTICIPANT [Robin Jacob, Former Lord Justice of Appeal of the Court of 
Appeal, London; Faculty of Laws, University College London, London]: We go to enjoy 
ourselves. [Laughter] 
PARTICIPANT [Judge Klaus Grabinski, Federal Court of Justice, Karlsruhe]: I 
would like to pick up on Mrs. Kanz’s comment. I was never really convinced of the 
infringement test.  
I was much more convinced of an approach that was first taken by Robin Jacob in 
an early case, the Takeda case,17 which is simply saying: “You have two components in 
the patent, A and B, and of course a product that has A + B + C is infringing, but it is not 
infringing because there is C; it is only infringing because there is A and B. That is not a 
justification to get an SPC for A + B + C.” 
In that approach I think the CJEU in principle is right.18 This is a bit also what 
Peter Meier-Beck said, with which I fully concur: A + B yes; everything else is disclosed 
in the patent; possibly also equivalents to A + B because they are identifiable as long as 
they are obvious — that is the equivalents test to some extent. Along that line you could 
interpret the case law of the CJEU.  
Like Rian, I was at the meeting at the Max Planck Institute, and I happened to 
moderate the panel on Article 3(a). At least all the people who were on the panel came to 
the conclusion that any amendment of the current Article 3(a) would only increase confu-
sion, so better let it be there and try to further develop the approach of the CJEU. I fully 
agree we are not there, that is absolutely clear. That is a fairy tale. 
But I think there is a way. I’m really doubtful that if we would amend and add 
other words or have another definition in the Regulation then it would become clearer. I 
think the confusion would be greater then. 
I agree with Hans saying the approach of the CJEU needs to be further developed 
and it is a difficult issue. 
MS. VAN DEN HORST: I also have a short comment. Tom mentioned that the 
judges of the CJEU might not have enough intense knowledge of patent law, and I think 
Rian’s remark also hinted at that. 
 
17 Takeda Chemical Industries Ltd's SPC Applications (No 3) [2004] RPC 3. 
18 See Case C-322/10, Medeva BV v Comptroller Gen. of Patents, ECLI:EU:C:2011:773 
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But what I don’t hear is the knowledge on regulatory law. I do believe strongly — 
and I was also at the Max Planck Institute seminar and I kept on repeating this — that 
regulatory law is an essential component in SPCs because it is clear that the SPC protection 
was created to compensate for time lost as a result of the regulatory process. 
We have seen not as much legislation and case law on Articles 3(b) and 3(d), and 
Neurim was in my view very erroneous, not taking into account the regulatory aspects and 
the differences between human and veterinary products and the concept of first marketing 
authorization. I urge courts to take the regulatory aspects of SPCs into account more.  
To come back to a comment of the Max Planck Institute, they said that reform is 
necessary because the CJEU is asked through preliminary questions to deal with every 
aspect of, for example, Article 3 separately; so it’s either 3(a) or 3(c) or 3(b) or 3(d), but 
not in a comprehensive way. If we would deal with Article 3 and all the components in a 
comprehensive way, it would allow us to bring some balance there. 
MS. BÉNARD: Just to add to what Marleen just said — and yes, of course, the 
judges in the CJEU are not specialized in patent law — I think the problem is that we are 
trying to apply patent law to an SPC, which is not a patent. It is something different. This 
is why I have been saying that the core inventive advance is not the right test. This is why 
I like Rian’s proposal to apply an infringement test, which would be easy to apply for 
nonspecialized patent judges. 
MR. JÜNGST: Thank you very much. 
